

## Federalist 77

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I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the subject of appointments without taking notice of a scheme for which there have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House of Representatives in the power of making them. I shall, however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance of any considerable part of the community. A body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, **when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred persons**. All the advantages of the stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this union, and infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned. The example of most of the States in their local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the idea.

Link to the full text of Federalist 77:

[https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th\\_century/fed77.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed77.asp)